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SOVEREIGN DEBT SYMPOSIUM
Not only good faith
Staying of enforcement
Staying of enforcement plays a topical role in sovereign debt litigation as enforcing a debt
claim may have a negative impact on the dynamics of restructuring processes and the
regular functioning of financial markets for sovereign debt. Moreover, in the case of
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), it may also affect the resources pledged for
social expenditure. As a response to this problem, in January 2012 the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) adopted the Principles on Promoting
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing which serve the purpose of providing a
common level playing field for any type of sovereign indebtedness in negotiating and
restructuring the terms of loan agreements. According to Principle No. 7, lenders are
called to behave in good faith and with cooperative spirit with debtors towards a
consensual rearrangement of the outstanding debt. As a corollary, good faith would
involve a standstill in enforcing sovereign debt claims in connection with sovereign
workouts. A number of decisions delivered by certain municipal courts would point to the
progressive emergence of this rule (Goldmann, pp. 136-140).
However, this picture presents some flaws. First of all, the case-law is not so conclusive
to deduce the emergence of a precedent. Moreover, the stay of enforcement is connected
to specific circumstances: it is related to a restructuring process and confined to a
limited period of time. This implies that outside this scheme the stay of enforcement
could not operate. Nevertheless, the need to stay enforcement of debt claims against a
sovereign borrower in distress can arise also under different situations. To the extent
that enforcing may negatively affect the provision of social services it is possible to resort
to an alternative route by considering stay of enforcement as a corollary of debt
sustainability.
Staying – but not too long
At first sight, the analysis of certain US cases would indicate the emergence of a trend
towards staying of enforcement. However, the conditions set out in this cases for staying
are so circumscribed as to appear more exceptional and limited occurrences rather than
an emerging precedent. They are not really able to erode the doctrine of the bindingness
of contracts (pacta sunt servanda). Therefore, the fundamental rule that creditors’ rights
are fully enforceable against a restructuring process and its implementation is
substantively preserved.
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In Pravin Banker IV, the Court of Appeals emphasised that an indefinite suspension of the
proceedings pending the outcome of a restructuring process would contradict the
prevailing principle that creditors’ rights should be safeguarded and make the
enforcement of their rights conditional on the completion of a process without a
deadline. Consistent with this view, the Court upheld a 6-month suspension granted by
the lower court (Pravin Banker Associates Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F 3d 850
(2nd Cir 1997)).
Also in EM Ltd the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the lower court was
right in using its discretion on vacating the attachment so as to avoid a substantial risk to
the outcome of an ongoing restructuring process, which was “of critical importance to
the economic health of a nation” (EM LTD et al. v. The Republic of Argentina, 131 Fed Appx
745 (2nd Cir 2005)). This position was supported by the Department of Justice that in its
Statement of Interests underscored the need for a consensual orderly restructuring
process under the auspices of the international financial institutions.
The position by the Department of Justice played a key role also in Allied Bank, though
with a different outcome. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stayed the
enforcement of  creditors’ claims on the comity assumption that the Costa Rica’s
prohibition of payments was not a repudiation of the debt but rather a mere deferral of
payments pending negotiations (Allied Bank Int’l v Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago 733
F2d 23 (2d Cir 1984)). However, on rehearing the Court reversed its previous decision
acknowledging the contrariety expressed by the US Administration and thereby enforced
the claims (Allied Bank int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F2d 516 (2d Cir
1984)).
In Capital Ventures the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed the
attachment to the collateral of the Brady Bonds involved in the exchange offer arranged
by Argentina in 2010, by emphasising that the remedy was just a consequence of the
exercise of Capital Ventures’ contractual rights under New York law. Further, the small
amount of the bonds involved in the 2010 exchange offer did not imply that a failure of
the offer would have had a negative effect for Argentina (Capital Ventures Int’l v.
Argentina, 652 F.3d 266 (2011)).
Along the same lines, in NML the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit underscored
that it is consistent with the necessity to preserve the integrity of the rule pacta sunt
servanda to require debtors, including foreign sovereign debtors, to pay their dues.
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that the judicial victory by creditors would
have encouraged more bondholders to step out of the restructuring processes to secure
better terms and emphasised that the Argentina was a “uniquely recalcitrant debtor”
(NML Capital Ltd v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2nd Cir)).
Against that background, the only room for manoeuvre for a medium-term stay of
enforcement in relation to disruptive claims brought against a sovereign debtor is a clear
statement by the US Administration on its consistency with the law and policy of the
United States. Unfortunately, it is rather unlikely that the incoming US Administration
would take such a step.
Stay the unsustainable
In the absence of a comity endorsement by the US Administration, the justification for
staying  must be found elsewhere. A workable solution consists of raising the defence of
debt sustainability. From an international law point of view, debt sustainability might
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amount to a general principle of international law reflecting two public interests:
economic development and protection of human rights (Bohoslavsky and Goldmann, p.
21, 26). In this context, debt sustainability does not necessarily coincide with IMF Debt
Sustainability Analysis as this latter does not take into sufficient account social standards
and distributional consequences of restructurings and adjustments (Riegner, p. 148). This
is particularly evident when enforcing a sovereign debt would impair the provision of
social services to the population. In a case like that, payments would be suspended and
tailored accordingly.
In the case of enforcing foreign judgments, this rule may come into play within the
umbrella of international public policy. Compared to internal public policy, international
public policy is certainly narrower in operation but wider in content as it also includes
norms of international law. These norms would also reasonably comprise the necessity to
preserve a minimum standard of social rights by means of rescheduling payments.
In the case of enforcing contractual rights, this rule may come into play as a sort of
overriding  mandatory rule of the forum to be applied irrespective of the applicable law. If
we assume that these mandatory rules consist of provisions the respect of which is
regarded as crucial for safeguarding public interests of a specific country, such as its
political, social, or economic organisation (cf. Art. 9, para 1, Regulation (EC) 593/2008), it
is not unreasonable to hold that the necessity to preserve a certain level of social services
may fall within this purview with the consequential corollary of a rescheduling of
payments.
Although debt sustainability is better appreciated under a restructuring process, it can
also play a role in courts as far as single enforcements would negatively affect the
provision of social services.  This the case of HIPCs the resources of which can easily be
negatively affected by enforcements. As recorded in the practice, the potential impact of
judicial awards for these countries have varied from less than 0.5 per cent to 49 per cent
of the debtor country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Cephas Lumina, Report of the
independent expert on the effects of foreign debt, 2010, pp. 5-6). A legal defence like that
described above may certainly reduce the problems associated with enforcement in
these cases.
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